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The Elimination of Gender Discrimination in Insurance
Pricing: Does Automobile Insurance Rate
Without Sex?
In recent years, American society has increasingly scrutinized
classifications based on gender. This social consciousness has pro-
duced federal legislation banning sex discrimination in housing,'
credit,2 and employment.3 In these areas, Congress has demon-
strated that equitable treatment of men and women is socially
mandated.
This trend has also reached the insurance field. The United
States Supreme Court first prohibited gender-based distinctions in
insurance in 1978 with City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and
Power v. Manhart.4 In 1983, Arizona Governing Committee for Tax De-
ferred Annuity And Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris5 extended the
Manhart rationale of equal treatment. The Court, however, re-
stricted these cases to Title V116 violations in employer-sponsored
pension programs which treated men and women differently.
Despite these decisions, laws outlawing gender-based discrimi-
nation have come slowly. Advocates of unisex insurance contend
that the policy supporting Title VII's protection of the individual
should extend with equal vigor outside the employment context to
private markets such as automobile insurance. 7 Insurers, however,
have resisted this extension of the Manhart-Norris rationale.8 As a
result, state legislatures have encountered effective lobbying
against changes to unisex insurance and ineffective implementation
1 See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Fair Housing Act, tit. 8, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1977 & Supp. 1985)).
2 See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1980 & Supp. 1985)).
3 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1981)); Equal Employment Opportunities Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314,
5315, 5316; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-6, 2000e-8 to e-9, 2000e-13 to e-17 (1981)).
4 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See notes 12-15 infra and accompanying text.
5 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
6 Section 703(A)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. . ..
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1981).
7 See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 36 and 64 infra and accompanying text.
of unisex statutes once adopted. 9
This note analyzes the issue of gender-based distinctions in au-
tomobile insurance classification. Part I examines the foundations
of the unisex insurance argument and the current attempts to legis-
late this goal. Part II assembles the arguments voiced against
proposed federal unisex legislation. Part II then applies these ar-
guments to the automobile classification controversy, concluding
that these objections are accurate in the broader insurance context
but not for automobile classifications which do not consider sex.
Part III focuses on the inadequacies of statutes which currently pro-
hibit gender-based distinctions in automobile insurance and sug-
gests a rating alternative. Part IV looks to the future of automobile
insurance and predicts the manner in which changes are likely to
come about.
I. Foundations of Unisex Insurance and Unisex Legislation
When assessing the positions of insurance lobbyists and those
proposing change to the current classification system, the dual
goals of actuarial validity and social fairness must be constantly bal-
anced. While either objective may be achieved at the expense of
the other, a system can be equitable to all participants only when
both goals are met. The concept of unisex insurance rests princi-
pally upon the goal of social fairness. As drawn from changing so-
cial attitudes towards the elimination of sex-based classifications,10
this position equates social fairness with equal treatment of the
sexes.
The Supreme Court has mandated the equal treatment of the
sexes in an insurance context in Manhart and Norris. In both of
these instances, the Court drew support for its findings from the
policy of Title VII.1 In Manhart, the Court held that Title VII pro-
hibited higher required monthly contributions by women to an em-
ployer-sponsored pension to obtain payments equal to those of
men.' 2 The Court stated that Title VII's "focus on the individual is
unambiguous"1 3 and that "[e]ven a true generalization about the
class is an insufficient reason to disqualify an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply."' 4 Despite actuarial data which
established that women live longer than men, the Court deter-
9 See notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
II See notes 12-18 infra and accompanying text.
12 435 U.S. at 702.
13 Id. at 708. Title VII "makes it unlawful 'to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Id.
14 Id.
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mined that this statistical distinction could not serve as the basis for
unequal treatment of the two groups.' 5 In Norris, the Court found
unfair discrimination where an employer paid lower pension bene-
fits to women despite equal contributions by men and women.' 6
Justice Marshall reasoned that "classification of employees on the
basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retire-
ment plan than at the pay-in stage."' 7 In again rejecting the prof-
fered actuarial data, the Court reemphasized Title VII's individual
focus.' 8
Women's rights advocates contend that the social policy
adopted by the Supreme Court in Manhart and Norris should extend
outside the employment context to the insurance field. Analogies
to racial distinctions, which are prohibited in insurance despite ac-
tuarial differences in racial groups, strongly support this theory. 19
Additionally, the very nature of insurance regulation recognizes
that social goals may demand insurance practices which vary from
purely economic considerations.20 As our society and its attitudes
toward social responsibility progress, insurers must reflect this
change in insurance practices. While the Manhart-Norris prohibition
of gender discrimination in employer-sponsored pensions is so-
cially correct, it addresses a symptom of the problem but not the
source. By applying its prohibition to employers but not insurers,
the current treatment leaves the underlying problem unchecked.2 1
Lawmakers have responded to the pressures to extend the pol-
icy goal of equal treatment of the sexes by proposing unisex insur-
ance legislation. While attempts to implement comprehensive uni-
sex insurance statutes at the state level have generally failed,22
15 Id. at 707-08.
16 463 U.S. at 1074-75.
17 Id. at 1081.
18 Id. at 1083. The court stated that "[tihis underlying assumption-that sex may prop-
erly be used to predict longevity-is flatly inconsistent with the basic teaching of Manhart:
That Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as individuals, not 'as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.'" Id.
19 See Jerry & Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another Perspective, 34 AM. U.L. REV.
329 (1985).
20 Note, Sex Discrimination And Sex Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REV. 624, 651 (1973).
21 See Nondiscrimination In Insurance Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 1 st Sess. 45 (198 1) (statement of Catherine East on behalf of the National Organiza-
tion for Women) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearings]. See also Comment, Banning
"Actuarially Sound" Discrimination: The Proosed Nondiscrimination In Insurance Act, 20 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 631, 635 (1983) ("sex discrimination by private insurers is as offensive to con-
cepts of individual equality as is sex discrimination by employers").
22 While stirring much activity, only Montana has enacted a statute which prohibits dis-
crimination based upon sex in all types of insurance. MoT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1985).
This provision, entitled "Discrimination in Insurance and Retirement Plans," states:
(1) It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any financial institution or person
to discriminate solely on the basis of sex or marital status in the issuance or opera-
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unisex advocates have been successful in the narrower area of auto-
mobile insurance. Hawaii, 23 North Carolina,24 Massachusetts, 25
and Michigan 26 have enacted statutes which prohibit discrimination
by sex in automobile risk rating. These statutes supplement two
types of laws currently existing in most states. The existing laws
help prevent discrimination in limited areas of automobile insur-
ance, but have failed to achieve the unisex rating goal. All fifty
states, for instance, have statutes prohibiting insurance prices
which are "unfair" within a class. 27 These statutes have not prohib-
ited gender discrimination, however, because states have generally
accepted the insurance justification that men and women do not
occupy the same class for rating purposes. 28 Thus, insurers can
tion of any type of insurance policy, plan, or coverage or in any pension or retire-
ment plan, program, or coverage, including discrimination in regard to rates or
premiums and payments or benefits.
At least ten other states have proposed similar legislation. See Flaherty, Insurance Goes
Unisex Under Law in Montana, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 11, col. 1. This article quotes
Celinda Lake of the Women's Lobbyist Fund as listing eight states which have recently
considered, or are considering, bills similar to the Montana law: California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. Addi-
tionally, Maryland and Missouri have introduced similar legislation.
23 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-33 (1976) ("No insurer shall base any standard or rating
plan, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, upon race, creed, ethnic extraction, age, sex,
length of driving experience, credit bureau rating, or marital status.").
24 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(4) (1982) ("No such classification plans shall base any
standard or rating plan for private passenger (nonfleet) motor vehicles, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, upon the age or sex of the persons insured.").
25 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175E, § 4(d) (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1984) ("For motor ve-
hicle insurance rates, risks shall not be grouped by sex or marital status .. ").
26 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2027(c) (West 1983) ("Unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance include . . .
[c]harging a different rate for the same coverage based on sex, marital status, age, resi-
dence, location of risk, handicap, or lawful occupation of the risk unless the rate differential
is based on sound actuarial principles, a reasonable classification system, and is related to
the actual and credible loss statistics or reasonably anticipated experience in the case of
new coverages.").
27 See Flaherty, The "Unisex" Policy Uproar, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 28, 1983, at 9, col. 3;Jerry &
Mansfield, supra note 19, at 336 (stating that a majority of states have adopted a model
statute formulated by the All-Industry Committee of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC)). See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,
MODEL INSURANCE LAws, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES (1977).
28 See, e.g., Simmons v. Continental Casualty Co., 285 F. Supp. 997 (D. Neb. 1968), affid, 410
F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Flaherty, supra note 27, at 9;Jerry & Mansfield, supra note
19, at 336.
On this basis, at least three states have rejected Department of Insurance challenges to
the "unfairness" of sex-differentiated rates as an improper exercise of delegated legislative
authority. See State Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (court invalidated Department of Insurance order holding that applicable stat-
utes do not authorize prohibition of the use of sex, marital status, and scholastic achieve-
ment as rating factors in automobile insurance), pet. for review denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla.
1984); Insurance Serv. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(court invalidated order of insurance commissioner requiring automobile insurers to desist
from charging premiums based on rating plans using age and sex as criteria), writ of review
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treat men and women, as members of separate classes, differently
under these laws. A second type of state statute, which exists in
about thirty-five states, purports to prohibit gender discrimination
in all types of insurance. 29 While prohibiting some forms of sex
discrimination with regard to the availability, coverage, and condi-
tions of insurance, these statutes have little effect on discriminatory
rates and costs. 30
While proposed repeatedly, federal unisex insurance legisla-
tion has failed to gain the congressional support needed for pas-
sage. The federal bills have attempted to implement unisex
insurance comprehensively, as Montana did in its state enactment
of unisex legislation. 3' Comprehensive bills in both the House3 2
and the Senate33 failed to pass in the 98th Congress. These bills
sought to apply the federal legislation to existing insurance con-
tracts, 34 a provision which state legislation has specifically ex-
empted.35 In the mark-up of the House bill, its supporters
compromised this controversial portion of the legislation in an
denied, 382 So. 2d 1391 (La. 1979); Mortgate Guarantee Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 671 P.2d
811 (Wyo. 1983) (dismissing appeals based on the regulatory authority of the Commis-
sioner of Insurance in light of 1983 Wyoming Session Law chapter 186, which provided a
presumption of competitive markets in insurance coverage and limited the authority of the
Commissioner of Insurance to noncompetitive markets). See also Who Pays the Bill for Unisex
Auto Insurance, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 15, 1984, at 42-43 (discussing developments in unisex auto-
mobile insurance).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a different conclusion when it read Penn-
sylvania's requirement of "fair" rates in conjunction with the state equal rights amendment.
Unlike courts in other states interpreting this question, the Pennsylvania Court rejected the
insurer's argument that "unfair" should be limited to "actuarially unfair." Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984).
The Pennsylvania state legislature, however, reversed the Supreme Court's declaration
of unisex automobile rating statutorily. In 1985, the Pennsylvania Senate passed Senate
Bill No. 745, which amended the Casualty and Surety Rate Act ofJune 11, 1947, P.L. 538,
§ 3(d), 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1183(d) (1971), to read:
This section shall not be construed to prohibit rates for automobile insurance
which are based in whole or in part on factors including, but not limited to, sex, if
the use of such a factor is supported by sound actuarial principles or is related to
actual reasonably anticipated experience.
The Pennsylvania House passed the identical House Bill No. 452 in February of 1986.
Governor Richard Thornburgh vetoed the bill, however. The pro-industry forces in the
House succeeded in overriding the Governor's veto with votes on April 8 and 9 achieving
the necessary two-thirds majority. The veto override was then sent to the Senate, which
took similar action. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 10, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
29 See Flaherty, supra note 27, at 9.
30 Id.
31 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
32 Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983) (introduced by Rep. Robert Dingell).
33 Fair Insurance Practices Act, S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S795
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983) (introduced by Sens. Mark Hatfield, Ernest Hollings, and Robert
Packwood).
34 See S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1983).
35 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309(2) (1985) ("This section does not apply to any
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amendment which stripped the bill of most of its substance.8 6 The
remaining bill, limited only to employer-sponsored plans, had no
application to automobile insurance. Supporters introduced simi-
lar legislation in the 99th Congress.3 7
These efforts aim to reform insurance classification schemes by
prohibiting the use of sex as a rating variable. Instead of combin-
ing the twin goals of actuarial validity and social fairness, the legis-
lation has drawn from the analysis in Manhart and Norris and
insurance policy, plan, coverage, any pension or retirement plan, program, or coverage in
effect prior to October 1, 1985.").
36 The House Commerce Committee amended H.R. 100 to exempt any insurance con-
tract which was not a part of an employee benefit plan. HousE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., AMENDMENT OFFERED BY CONG. TAUZIN 1 (1984) (amend-
ing HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., SUBSTITUTE OFFERED
BY CONG. DOWDY 7 (1984) as amending H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG.
REC. H42 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983)). This provision for exemptions of private contracts
would have excluded automobile insurance from the bill's mandate of unisex insurance. See
Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 19, at 337-38 (stating that the House amendment would do no
more than codify the Manhart and Norris decisions).
37 See H.R. 1798, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See also Economic Equity Act of 1985,
H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced May 13, 1985, by Rep. Schroeder) (title 3 of
the Act is the insurance portion of the bill containing the Nondiscrimination In Insurance
Act, §§ 301-310); Economic Equity Act of 1985, S. 1169, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced
May 20, 1985, by Sen. Durenberger) (title 3 of this act is the insurance portion of the bill
containing the Fair Insurance Practices Act, §§ 301-310). The insurance provisions of the
broad Economic Equity Act of 1985, which failed to pass in the 99th Congress, had com-
promised two controversial aspects of previous legislation in an effort to rally more support
for the unisex objective.
First, unlike the bills proposed in the 98th Congress, the Economic Equity Act of 1985
was not comprehensive. See, e.g., Economic Equity Act of 1985, H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 303(b) ("Nothing in this part shall affect the amount or type of benefits due under a
contract of insurance the terms of which provide for regular recurring periodic benefits if
such regularly recurring periodic benefits have begun to be paid before the effective date of
this part."). See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE FAIR INSURANCE PRACTICES ACT (Report to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, et. al.) 5-6
(Apr. 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT] (concluding that the retroactive eco-
nomic effect of S. 372 would bankrupt some insurers and recommending a clause exempt-
ing existing contracts).
Second, unlike the legislation in the 98th Congress which contained a 90-day transition
period, the Economic Equity Act of 1985 would have taken effect one year after its date of
enactment. See, e.g., Economic Equity Act of 1985, H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 310.
See also GAO REPORT, supra, at 5-6 (concluding that the 90-day transition period of S. 372 is
infeasible and recommending an implementation period of at least 18 months). Unlike the
amended House bill of the 98th Congress and its current follow-up, the unisex mandate of
the Economic Equity Act remained applicable to automobile insurance. See, e.g., Economic
Equity Act of 1985, H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(f).
Finally, an alternative proposal introduced in the 99th Congress would federalize laws
which prohibit sex discrimination in insurance availability. See H.R. 676, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (introduced January 24, 1985, by Rep. Holt). See also notes 29-30 supra and accompa-
nying text. Despite its purported objectives, this bill would have no effect on gender dis-
tinctions in insurance rating. See H.R. 676, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. ("Nothing in this Act shall
prevent any person who contracts to insure another from setting rates for such insurance in
accordance with relevant actuarial data, even if such rates differ with respect to the sex of
the insured.").
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focuses only on social fairness at the expense of actuarial validity. The
resulting distinction between "unisex insurance alone" and "classi-
fication without regard to sex" is critical. 38
II. Classification Without Sex in Automobile Insurance
The nature of insurance is risk-distribution. Insurance reduces
the uncertainty of financial loss by transferring the risk of loss from
individuals to an insurer. The insurer establishes groups which
contribute premium payments to a common fund. The objective of
the fund is to cover the aggregate losses and expenses of the classi-
fied group. To adequately fund its insurance pool, an insurer must
accurately estimate losses of those classified in the insured group.
This process is known as ratemaking. The greater the probability
of loss, the greater the price of insurance for the classified group.3 9
This grouping process presents the fundamental dichotomy be-
tween the insurance tradition and society's quest for civil rights. As
emphasized in Manhart40 and Norris,4 1 civil rights legislation focuses
on the fair treatment of individuals. Insurance, on the other hand,
focuses on the grouping of people for risk classification. These prin-
ciples clash only when groups are based on traditionally forbidden
classifications-such as race, national origin, sex, and religion.42
The attitudes expressed towards proposed federal unisex legis-
lation clearly shows this clash of principles. While applauded and
endorsed by advocates of civil rights, 43 the insurance lobby has ve-
hemently opposed the legislation. Opponents of proposed unisex
38 See notes 82-85 infra and accompanying text.
39 See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 178 (statement of Diana Lee on behalf of
the National Association of Independent Insurers).
40 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
41 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983).
42 Gray & Shtasel, Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1985, at 89. Other
commentators have captured this conflict by stating that "[t]he insurance tradition analyzes
risks, premiums, and benefit schedules in terms of groups; most actuaries cannot think of
individuals except as members of groups. . .. [H]owever, the main civil rights tradition
analyzes rights in terms of individuals." Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Dis-
crimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Cm.
L. REV. 505, 508 (1980) [hereinafter cited as A Legal and Demographic Analysis].
Similarly, Bernstein argues that the application of civil rights analysis to insurance is
fundamentally flawed. "In applying civil rights logic to insurance, which is grounded in
discrimination-fair discrimination but discrimination nonetheless-either Congress or the
Court created an irreconcilable conflict. The effect on the marketplace reflects this miscar-
riage of admirable intentions." Bernstein, The Havoc in Retirement Benefits after Norris, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1984, at 80-81.
43 Sen. Hatfield's statement introducing the Fair Insurance Practice Act, S. 372, in the
98th Congress listed the following groups as supporting the bill: the American Association
of University Women, the AFL-CIO, the National Federation of Business and Professional
Women, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Women's Equity Action League,
the National Women's Political Caucus, and the National Organization for Women. 129
CONG. REc. S829 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983).
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statutes have acknowledged the legitimate social goal served by
such legislation,44 but they continue to attack the proposed laws.
Insurers, for example, claim that gender-based classification
schemes are actuarially valid, and that the proposed legislation will
create adverse economic effects. In 1984, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) issued a report 45 analyzing the economic implications
of the unisex legislation proposed in the 98th Congress. It pre-
dicted that both market imbalances and excessive costs would fol-
low the implementation of comprehensive federal unisex
legislation.46 The claims of actuarial validity, market imbalances,
and excessive costs deserve answering before the problems and
benefits of implementing such legislation are presented.
A. Objections to Unisex Insurance
1. Actuarial Fairness
In Manhart, the Supreme Court acknowledged that women, on
the average, live longer than men.47 For this reason, private insur-
ers charge women less on life insurance48 while charging more for
annuities. 49 Insurers use this same analysis in the automobile insur-
ance market; women's insurance premiums are less than men's be-
cause men are involved in more accidents, cost more to insure per
accident, and are more often fatally injured than women.50 Thus,
insurers maintain that classification according to gender is a statisti-
cally valid predictor of risk, and, because their livelihood depends
upon predicting risk, they argue that it is necessary. According to
44 See, e.g., Lautzenheiser, Roberts & Walters, H.R. 100/S. 372: Are They Necessary?, 2J.
INS. REG. 11 (1983).
45 See note 37 supra.
46 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 4-6.
47 435 U.S. at 704. See also Comment, Sex Stereotyping and Statistics-Equality in an Insur-
ance Context, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 137 (1983) (quoting statistics supporting the propo-
sition that women live longer than men).
48 Because the life expectancy of women is longer, their monthly premium payments
are less in an effort to achieve the same total payout. See generally Bernstein, supra note 42;
Christensen, Reasonable Sex Discrimination, TR. & EST., Oct. 1983, at 57.
49 Annuities function in a manner exactly opposite from life insurance. Because wo-
men are expected to live longer than men, their monthly payouts are less in an effort to
equalize the total fund extended. See generally Christensen, supra note 48.
Women's groups note that the complimentary effects of life insurance and annuities
are not achieved because differential setback rates are used in life insurance, as compared
to annuities, to the disadvantage of women. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 50
(statement of Mary Gray, President of the Women's Equity Action League); S. REP. No.
671, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
50 See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 199-203 (statement ofthe Alliance of Amer-
ican Insurers); Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 372 Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-72 (1983) (statement of Thomas
O'Day, Assistant Vice President, Alliance of American Insurers) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Senate Hearings].
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this argument, not only is it statistically valid to differentiate on the
basis of sex, but it would be unfair not to do so.5' As the Attorney
General for the state of Washington noted in an opinion:
"[E]quality of treatment may be denied as much by equal applica-
tion of a single standard to persons unequally situated as by appli-
cation of unequal standards to persons equally situated."
52
2. Market Imbalances
The effect of imposing unisex legislation on contracts in the
private market differs from the effect of implementing the same re-
quirements in an employment context. Unlike recipients of em-
ployee pension benefits, insurance purchasers in the open market
are free to alter their insurance purchases in accordance with mar-
ket incentives. Critics of unisex insurance claim that prohibiting
classification by sex disrupts economic efficiency. They contend
that because unisex legislation forces insurers to charge rates that
are inconsistent with the risks involved, unfair subsidization re-
sults.5 3 In automobile insurance, for example, critics claim that im-
position of unisex insurance will cause women's rates to rise
unnaturally in proportion to their risk. 54 According to the theory of
adverse selection, insurance customers in the private market, moti-
vated by self interest, will respond to the change in insurance pric-
ing by altering their buying patterns. 55 Those who are under-
charged will buy more, and those who are overcharged will buy
less. 56 This process would lead to further market distortions and
force insurers to leave the market because of rising costs. 57
3. Costs
The most controversial aspect of proposed unisex legislation is
the costs of such a wholesale change in the insurance market. In-
surers argue that the adoption of unisex insurance will result in in-
creased costs to both insureds and insurers. Individual premium
increases resulting from market imbalances are an initial measure
51 See generally Miller, How to Discriminate By Sex: Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry,
17 CONN. L. REV. 567 (1985); Miller, Discrimination by Gender in Automobile Insurance: A Note on
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 621
(1985); Bernstein, supra note 42; 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 209, 231.
52 1973 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 21. See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination
in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 489, 542 (1982).
53 See generally Bernstein, supra note 42.
54 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984, at 34, col. 4 (late city final edition); Wallace, Unisex
Automobile Rating: The Michigan Experience, 3J. INS. REG. 127 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The
Michigan Experience].
55 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 25 app.; Comment, supra note 47, at 144.
56 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 25 app..
57 See id.; Comment, supra note 47, at 143.
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of the costs of unisex insurance. As a result of the predicted subsi-
dization which would result from the elimination of sex as a rating
variable, the American Academy of Actuaries estimates that wo-
men's automobile insurance premiums would increase by $700 mil-
lion.58 Individually, the predicted increase in premiums for women
has ranged from twenty to thirty percent. 59 Data from the states
which have implemented unisex automobile insurance support
these predictions. In Michigan, for example, the change to unisex
rating caused the average annual premium for single women under
twenty-five to rise by approximately twenty percent, while premi-
ums of single males in the same category fell by fifteen percent. 60
Insurance premiums in Montana have reacted similarly.6'
Unisex insurance would also increase the financial burden on
insurers. One form of increased costs results from the imposition
of unfunded liabilities. Because insurance companies are required
to keep the present value of their liabilities in reserve funds, an in-
crease in an insurer's liability because of unisex mandates would
require a corresponding increase in required reserves. The GAO
Report predicted that insurer bankruptcies could result from the
added financial burden of unfunded liabilities.6 2 Requiring insur-
ers to implement unisex insurance retroactively would magnify this
problem.6 3 Objections to the extreme costs of such a provision re-
58 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 177 (American Academy of Actuaries study).
59 See, e.g., 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 178, 209 (citing cost increase predic-
tions of 22 and 26%).
60 See The Michigan Experience, supra note 54, at 129. The author cautions that it is incor-
rect to conclude that the price changes cited result totally from unisex implementation, as
an inflation factor and the effect of rate surcharges based on driving record are not ac-
counted for. Id. Whether or not thefull increase in women's premiums can be attributed to
unisex implementation, it is clear that much of the increase resulted from the change.
61 See Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 6, 1985, at 1-B ("In general, auto insurance premiums
have increased for women and married couples under 25 and decreased for men under 25.
Rates for people over 25 were not affected.").
62 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 3. The severity of the insurers resulting liability de-
pends, to a great extent, on how a company chooses to meet the unisex requirement. Op-
posing sides disagree as to whether "topping up" of the lower of men's and women's
benefits is required or whether a middle ground between currently varying benefits would
be allowed. See id. at 6, 17-18 app.
63 Even the terminology concerning "retroactivity" has spurred conflict between insur-
ers and women's rights advocates. For the purposes of this note, three alternative measures
of relief are possible when addressing unisex legislation. First is legislation which would
affect payments already made on an insurance or pension contract. This is retroactive in
the true sense of the word. Extension of legislation this far has not been proposed. The
second type is legislation which exempts all existing contracts from a statute's require-
ments. This is not retroactive in any sense. The Montana state unisex statute, supra note
22, and the Economic Equity Act of 1985, supra note 37, illustrate this alternative.
Between these extremes, insurers and women's rights advocates have debated as to the
semantic classification of legislation which affects future payments of existing contracts.
H.R. 100 and S. 372, supra notes 32-33, are examples of this alternative. Those opposing
unisex legislation have labeled the effects of such statutes as retroactive. See, e.g., Bernstein,
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sulted in the failure of unisex legislation proposed in the 98th
Congress. 64
Another source of insurer costs is the administrative costs re-
quired to implement unisex legislation. The GAO Report stated
that "costs of revising old policies.... developing new policies ....
obtain[ing] state insurance department approval of the new poli-
cies.... and verifying rating data" 65 would be substantial. Thus,
insurers conclude that unisex insurance is a costly alternative which
is not actuarially justified.
B. Application to Automobile Insurance
These arguments raise valid concerns as to the problems of
unisex insurance generally. They do not, however, impose any bar-
iers to insurance classifications which do not consider sex in the
factually distinct setting of automobile insurance.
In terms of the actuarial validity of sex as a rating variable, the
prediction of risk in life insurance and pensions and the prediction
of driving risk are factually distinct. For life insurance and pen-
sions, sex is the primary rating variable. While it is true that sex-
based mortality tables have been criticized, 66 no rating variable has
accurately replaced sex in assessing mortality rates. While still
open to debate, it is possible that sex alone explains the different
life expectancy of men and women. In any event, it is undoubtedly
the best predictor of this variance in longevity. On the other hand,
an individual's sex does not affect his driving ability. This factor is
not even a valid predictor of risk. Other factors used in determin-
ing driving premiums, when substituted for sex, do explain the gen-
der difference in insurable risk.67 Thus, sex is not as important to
supra note 42, at 82. Proponents of this same legislation counter that the provisions apply
only prospectively to benefits and premiums paid after the effective date of the bill. See, e.g.,
Gray, The Case for Nondiscrimination In Insurance, 2J. INS. REG. 3 (1983). For the purpose of
conformity with the majority of writings on the subject, such a provision is labeled retroac-
tive in this note.
64 Those lobbying against the federal unisex legislation often cited the 1984 GAO Re-
port, which estimated the total unfunded liabilities of retroactive application of unisex in-
surance in life insurance and pensions to range from $16.0 to 32.2 billion. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 37, at 15. Objections to these purported costs resulted in the amend-
ment to H.R. 100 and its ultimate failure. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
65 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 15.
66 Professor Brilmayer makes several arguments: that the male/female mortality tables
are not stable, that women's longevity is not uniform throughout the world, and that socio-
economic factors account for the mortality differences which will change as soon as the
rates of women reflect their increasingly pressurized lifestyle (on account of the increase in
working women) and the effects of the number of women who began to smoke after the
1940s. A Legal and Demographic Analysis, supra note 42, at 539-59. See also S. REP. No. 671,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982).
67 See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
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actuarial validity in the automobile insurance area as it is in other
areas of insurance.
Likewise, the insurance argument of predicted market imbal-
ances does not apply to automobile insurance because it fails to ac-
count for the substitution of other rating variables. If automobile
rates were adjusted to reflect valid differences in insurable risk,
rather than left artificially neutral, no unfair subsidization between
classes would result. Moreover, two studies in Michigan indicate
that even where the adoption of unisex insurance was not accompa-
nied by a substitution of rating variables for drivers under twenty-
five, the predicted market imbalances did not occur. 68 Claims that
unisex insurance would decrease insurance availability69 and flood
applications into the state residuary insurance market 70 proved
unfounded. 71
Furthermore, analogizing life insurance to automobile insur-
ance shows the weakness of the market imbalance argument. If the
premise of adverse selection were true, the same market defect
would result whenever the insurance industry failed to calculate
separate actuarial tables for groups whose life expectancies differ. 72
The differences between life expectancies for whites and blacks,
rich and poor, and single and married men, however, have not
caused the favored groups to quit buying life insurance. Addition-
ally, eliminating race as a rating variable did not result in the pre-
dicted adverse selection consequences, adding historical support to
the argument against the theory of adverse selection.
The substitution of rating factors would also refute the cost ar-
guments of unisex insurance opponents. The GAO Report con-
cluded that the American Academy of Actuaries overstated the
estimate of the increase in women's automobile insurance as a re-
sult of unisex implementation because it assumed that insurers
68 The Michigan Experience, supra note 54; INSURANCE BUREAU, MICHIGAN DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, A YEAR OF CHANGE: THE ESSENTIAL INSURANCE ACT IN 1981 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ESSENTIAL INSURANCE].
69 The theory of adverse selection contends that unisex automobile rating would "arti-
ficially depress rates for young men to the point that insurers would be unwilling to sell
them insurance." The Michigan Experience, supra note 54, at 136. See also Retirement Equity Act
of 1983: Hearings on S. 19 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources. 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 225 (1983).
70 See The Michigan Experience, supra note 54, at 134; 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21,
at 257.
71 See The Michigan Experience, supra note 54, at 135-36 ("The data ... [does] not support
the notion that eliminating sex as a rating factor caused insurers to stop writing young
drivers in Michigan.... mhe change to unisex rating did not cause a disproportionate
number of young men without bad driving records to be denied insurance in the voluntary
market."); ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 68, at 37 ("Contrary to some predictions, very
few insurers withdrew from writing private passenger automobile.., insurance when the
Essential Insurance Act took effect.").
72 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 25 app.; Comment, supra note 47, at 143.
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would not use factors other than sex more extensively. 73 Studies
which supplement unisex implementation with the introduction of
other valid rating factors conclude that womens' rates will actually
decrease. The National Insurance Commissioners Organization
(NICO), for example, concluded that the net savings to women
would amount to $795 million.74 Other Studies have supported the
NICO findings. 75
In addition to the reduced costs from the substitution of rating
variables, implementation costs in unisex automobile insurance are
less than in the field of life insurance and pensions. Automobile
insurance presents no problem of insurer bankruptcies through un-
funded liabilities. In life insurance, where funding for payouts is
accumulated through long-term contracts, insurers might have
problems immediately funding their increased liabilities.7 6 In auto-
mobile insurance, however, the frequency of contract renewal
would allow companies to adjust premiums and coverage in a way
that avoids significant unfunded liabilities.77 Similarly, the short-
term nature of automobile insurance contracts precludes any need
for retroactivity in implementing a unisex basis. 78
In addition, administrative costs of compliance with unisex leg-
islation pose no obstacles to successful implementation of the law.
Again, the specific effects on automobile insurance in terms of the
costs of restructuring contracts are minimized because of the short-
term nature of automobile policies. The changeover to unisex re-
quirements could occur gradually as policies are renewed. Further-
more, administrative costs are no justification for discrimination
based upon immutable characteristics. In Frontiero v. Richardson,79
the Supreme Court stated that "any statutory scheme which draws a
sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving ad-
ministrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treat-
ment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,' and
therefore involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice for-
bidden by the [Constitution].. "80
73 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
74 D-3 Advisory Committee Report, Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Risk
Classification, Report of the D-3 Advisory Committee to the Task Force on Rates and Rat-
ing Procedures of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (May 1979). See
also GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 22 app.
75 In testimony before Congress in 1981, the New Jersey Commissioner of Insurance
detailed a plan to implement unisex insurance in NewJersey. With the substitution of other
rating variables, women's rates decreased in every county. 1981 House Hearings, supra note
21, at 172 (statement ofJames Sheeridan, Commissioner of Insurance, state of NewJersey).
76 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
77 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 4 app.
78 See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 50, at 199.
79 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
80 Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71, 77 (1971)).
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While it is easy to refute the insurer's justifications for sex dif-
ferentiation in automobile insurance, it cannot be denied that they
need some way to evaluate risk. Insurers do not object to the re-
moval of sex itself as a rating criterion but do object to the removal
of an effective rating criteria altogether. Substituting a socially neu-
tral classification for the sex classification mitigates or even elimi-
nates most of the insurer's objections.
III. Unisex Problems and Proposed Solution
A. Inadequacies of Current Unisex Automobile Insurance Alternatives
Unlike the limited classification scheme used in life insurance
rating, gender-based distinctions account for only one of many clas-
sification variables used in assessing automobile risk.81 Unisex leg-
islation does not fundamentally alter the current classification
system; it merely prohibits the use of sex as a factor in the insurer's
pool of available rating variables. This leaves the insurer with two
options-flat rate pricing without substituting other rating variables
("unisex insurance alone"), 82 or cost-based pricing, accomplished
by substituting valid rating variables for sex ("classification without
regard to sex").83
Unisex insurance alone results in exactly what its name implies;
equal (or unisex) rates for men and women. While this option
achieves the social policy goal of equitable treatment of the sexes, it
fails at achieving the equally important goal of actuarial validity. In
fact, given the variance in driving statistics of men and women as
groups, 84 unisex rates merely substitute one form of discrimination
81 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IM-
PROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 102 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as COMPTROLLER GEN. REPORT]. The plan of the Insurance Services Office (ISO),
which is used with variations in each state, currently consists of either 161 or 217 classes.
Rating factors are separated into primary and secondary classes. Primary factors, such as
age and sex, establish a base insurance rate. To this primary classification, secondary classi-
fications, based on merit, characteristics of the vehicle, vehicle use, and geographic loca-
tion, are then added or subtracted. An insurer calculates an individual's premium by
multiplying the base rate times the adjusted rating factor. Id. at 104-11. See also Abramoff,
Rating the Rating Schemes: Application of Constitutional Equal Protection Principles to Automobile
Insurance Practices, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 683, 689 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rating the Rating
Schemes].
The actual number of rating classes used varies by insurer. As a general rule, most
companies classify by age, vehicle use, and driving record for adults. The additional factors
of sex and marital status, as well as discounts for scholarship and driver training, are ap-
plied only to drivers under thirty. Thus, the elimination of sex as a rating variable primarily
affects younger drivers, who are currently grouped according to this rating variable. See
COMPTROLLER GEN. REPORT, supra, at 105-11.
82 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
83 See text accompanying note 38 supra. See also 1981 House Hearings, supra note 21, at
124 (statement of Ray Woodall, Vice President of National Association of Life Companies).
84 See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
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for another.8 5 Just as unequal treatment of the sexes constitutes
unfair discrimination according to social mandates, equalized rates
between groups whose insurable risks differ constitutes actuarially
unfair discrimination.
In the five states which have adopted statutes eliminating sex as
a rating variable, 86 insurers have adjusted to the legislation by im-
plementing undifferentiated flat prices for drivers under twenty-
five.8 7 Women's rates in these states have risen unnaturally to the
level of men's, fulfilling insurance industry predictions of undesir-
able results from unisex legislation.88 Contrary to insurance indus-
try contentions, however, these results are not the natural con-
sequences of eliminating sex as a rating variable, but result from
the failure of insurance companies to substitute other rating factors
for the eliminated variable.
The choice by insurers to implement flat-based pricing is in-
consistent with the industry's justifications for the retention of actu-
arial distinctions based upon sex. The insurance lobby has
maintained that sex-based distinctions are needed to ensure cost-
based pricing. 89 Insurers abandon this "commitment" to cost-
based pricing, however, when social policy demands eliminating
one rating variable from the pool of rating factors. The abandon-
ment of cost-based pricing cannot be tolerated when insurers can
implement other factors to account for the loss of sex in classifica-
tion; other factors which can achieve the actuarial validity of the sex
classification without the social unfairness.
B. Mileage as a Rating Variable
Since early studies first called for eliminating sex as a rating
variable,90 research has sought rating factors that satisfy the goals
of social acceptability and statistical validity. Mileage rating can
achieve both goals. Professor Regina Austin argues that mileage
rating, and other proposed classification schemes based on individ-
ual characteristics, fail because they are "subject to value judgments
that cannot be avoided by resort to a concensus agreed upon by all
85 See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
86 See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
87 See Essential Insurance, supra note 68, at 25 ("Rather than rating young drivers under
the new law on the same factors used for adult drivers, most insurers chose simply to drop
sex and marital status as rating factors and not replace them with other variables."); GAO
REPORT, supra note 37, at 29 app. ("factors have not been substituted for sex in the four
states with unisex rates") (this report was submitted prior to the passage of the Montana
unisex legislation).
88 See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
89 See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
90 See notes 92-95 infra and accompanying text.
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interested parties."91 But just as the reality of imperfect markets
does not impair the benefits of the economic model, the limitations
of the political process should not preclude the quest for more eq-
uitable and actuarially sound rating practices.
Despite their competing political goals in the unisex insurance
controversy, insurers and insureds agree on some criteria for the
evaluation of rating variables. The most crucial of these criteria is
causation. Studies on the causation of variances in driving statistics
by sex have long suggested that mileage driven, not driver sex, ex-
plains the difference in insurable risk. A 1978 study by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners stated that:
In terms of simplicity and consistency (i.e., stability and ease of
verification), age, sex, and marital status receive high marks as
rating factors. This is not the case from the viewpoint of causal-
ity. Causality refers to the actual or implied behavioral relation-
ship between a particular rating factor and loss potential. The
longer a vehicle is on the road, for example, the more likely it is
that the vehicle may be involved in a random traffic accident;
thus, daily or annual total mileage may be viewed as a causal
rating factor. To the extent that sex and marital status classifica-
tions may be defended on causal grounds, the implied behav-
ioral relationships rely largely on questionable social
stereotypes. 92
State Department of Insurance Studies in Massachusetts,9 3 New
Jersey,94 and Florida95 have come to similar conclusions. In addi-
tion, driving statistics reveal that the differences in actual miles
driven between males and females explains the difference in acci-
dent rates.96 Male accident rates remain higher than those of fe-
male drivers because men, as a group, drive twice as many miles as
women. 97 When accident figures are calculated on a per-mile basis,
the rates are comparable.98
91 Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 568 (1983).
92 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Report of the Rates and Rating
Procedures Task Force of the Automobile Insurance (D-3) Subcomm. 5-6 (Nov. 1978).
93 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Div. OF INS., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RISK
CLASSInCATION: Eourrv AND ACCURACY (1978) [hereinafter cited as Equrry AND Accu-
RACY]. See also COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSE-rTS, Div. OF INS., OPINION, FINDINGS AND
DECISION ON 1978 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES (Dec. 28, 1977).
94 NEWJERSEY DEP'T OF INS., HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND
RELATED METHODOLOGIES: FINAL DETERMINATIoN-ANALYSIS AND REPORT (1981).
95 FLORIDA'S AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION: REPORT TO THE INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER AND THE COMMISSIONER'S ORDERS AND FINDINGS (Oct 1, 1979).
96 Testimony of Patrick Butler, NOW, before the Human Rights Commission and the
State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance, State of Montana, NOW transcript at 8
(September 13, 1985) (available from the files of the Notre Dame Law Review).
97 Id. See also Note, Ending Sex Discrimination In Insurance: The Nondiscrimination In Insur-
ance Act, 11 J. OF LEGIS. 457, 468 (1984).
98 The greater weight of the evidence states that women actually have a higher per-mile
accident ratio. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination In Insurance Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 100 Before
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Other criterion for the evaluation of rating variables may sat-
isfy the competing concerns of insurers and insureds. Natalie
Shayer identified five such criteria in her research paper presented
to the Massachusetts Division of Insurance for its 1978 rate classifi-
cation hearings. 99 The criteria are admissibility, separation, homo-
geneity, reliability, and incentive value. Substituting miles driven
for sex in automobile classification satisfies all five criterion.
Shayer defines the admissibility of a rating variable in terms of
a standard of social acceptability. She states that "distinctions are
best able to meet the test of admissibility if they are within an indi-
vidual's ability to control and are causally related to the probability
of loss." 00 Clearly, the driver controls the number of miles driven.
In addition, expert testimony establishes that, other factors being
equal, the most accurate measure of risk of collision is mileage.10 '
Separation in a rating variable exists "if there is a practically
and statistically significant difference in the mean expected
losses"'1 2 of the classes it separates. Professor Jean Lemaire, in a
mathematical study, recently confirmed the utility of mileage as an
accurate variable in separating driving risks.103 Professor Lemaire
isolated thirty-eight potential rating variables and analyzed the ac-
curacy of each variable on automobile risk classifications using re-
gression analysis. 10 4 His findings supported the contentions that
mileage is a statistically significant rating variable, 0 5 while sex is
not. 0 6 He states that "the fact that policyholders who cause many
accidents where they are at fault have, on average, more accidents
where they are not at fault seems to be on account of higher expo-
sure to risk in terms of total distance travelled."' 1 7 Thus, mileage
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1983) (testimony of Wyona M. Lipman, chair, NewJersey Com-
mission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Hearings];J.
LEMAIRE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: ACTUARIAL MODELS 77 (1985); 1981 House Hearings,
supra note 21, at 193; S. REP. No. 671, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). But see 1983 House
Hearings, supra at 312-14 (statement of the Alliance of American Insurers) (contradicting the
statement of Ms. Lipman on the basis of the same data); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION (with California Department of Public Works),
THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO RISK ON DRIVING RECORD (June 1973).
99 See EQUITY AND ACCURACY, supra note 93, at 2-6.
100 Id. at 4.
101 See Testimony of Patrick Butler, supra note 96, at 9 (quoting estimates from the Na-
tional Safety Council, published by the Insurance Information Institute in the 1984-85
Property/Casualty Fact Book at 69). See also note 103 infra and accompanying text.
102 EQUITY AND ACCURACY, supra note 93, at 3.
103 J. LEMAIRE, supra note 98.
104 Id. at 96.
105 Id. at 99.
106 Id. at 90 ("Among the variables that do not appear in the solution is ... the driver's
sex. As a result, no sex discrimination should be allowed although the tables of claim fre-
quencies showed that women produced 6% more accident claims.").
107 Id. at 99.
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successfully separates classes of drivers who will have different
amounts of loss.
Closely related to separation is homogeneity. Where separa-
tion refers to the differences between insurance classes, homogene-
ity refers to differences within an established class. 108 One of the
strongest arguments against sex as a valid rating criteria is its fail-
ure to account for the wide individual variances within a class. In-
deed, the backbone of the unisex insurance movement is the quest
for individual treatment rather than broad brushed group classifica-
tions. 10 9 While the very concept of risk distribution prevents any
factor from achieving perfect homogeneity with a group, the use of
mileage as a rating variable moves closer to this goal through its
emphasis of individual driving characteristics instead of group
stereotypes.
A variable is reliable, according to Shayer, if it is "easy to ad-
minister and not readily susceptible to clerical error or fraud."' 110
Insurers have used administrative convenience as the primary justi-
fication for the retention of sex-based distinctions in the majority of
automobile classification schemes. As noted in a GAO report to
Congress, "State insurance departments have unquestionably ac-
cepted pricing schemes that are convenient for insurance compa-
nies, rather than effectively protecting the legal rights of their
citizens."' 1 Though mileage rating is not as simple as categoriza-
tion based on sex, it is administratively feasible. Data compiled by
Professor Lemaire on the automobile actuarial models used abroad
indicate that France, 1 2 Sweden, 313 and the Netherlands 1 4 rate ac-
cording to the annual distance which a vehicle travels.
Patrick Butler, of the National Organization for Women
(NOW), has proposed a similar plan for use in the United States.
108 EQuITY AND AccuRAcy, supra note 93, at 3.
109 See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
110 EqurrY AND AccuRAcY, supra note 93, at 4.
111 See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 50, at 60 (statement ofJohanna Mendelson on
behalf of American Association of University Women) (quoting a 1979 GAO Report to
Congress).
112 J. LEMAIRE, supra note 98, at 17. Under the French system, insurers are free to devise
their own premiums, but computation of the basic premium is limited to specific criteria,
including characteristics of the car, geographic area, vehicle use, and annual mileage. Id.
113 Id. at 31. In Sweden, all insurance companies are obliged to use identical risk factors
and identical classification of these factors. The classification factors mandated are geo-
graphic area, annual distance traveled, vehicle model, and bonus-malus system. Id. at 31-
32. A bonus-malus system establishes a basic premium which is adjusted upward or down-
ward depending upon whether claims are presented. In its rewarding of claim-free drivers
and punishment of drivers who present claims, it operates similar to a merit system. Id.
114 Id. at 27-29. The Netherlands allows insurers the freedom to set up their own premi-
ums and conditions. An extensive statistical study in that country recommended vehicle
weight, geographic area, a bonus-malus system, age, and distance traveled as exclusive rat-
ing variables. Id.
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Butler's plan is a per-mile rating system which divides insurance
premiums into two parts. The first part determines comprehensive
insurance premiums, independent of mileage, through a flat service
charge assessed at initiation and at each renewal. 11 5 The per-mile
factors alone would determine the premium for driving cover-
ages.' 16 Thus, a car not driven would not be assessed for these in-
surance coverages. Butler further suggests a reduction in the per-
mile rate as mileage increased."1 7 Under such a system, insurers
could approximate mileage before starting a new policy year. Such
a system has operated effectively in Sweden since 1961.118 In Swe-
den, if a driver's actual mileage differs from his estimated amount,
the driver receives a premium rebate for the conserved mileage or
pays an extra premium for the added travel. 1 9 Professor Lemaire
reports that anticipated problems of underreporting were avoided
through periodic reporting requirements and an annual inspec-
tion.120 In the United States, the administrative machinery for such
a system to function on the state level already exists. 12 1 In addition,
statutes exist both federally and at the state level to control odome-
ter tampering and fraud.
Mileage rating also meets Shayer's last criteria, the installation
of proper incentives. First, it would induce people to drive less and
reduce their exposure to risk. 122 Fixing insurance premiums to gas-
oline coupons had the same effect during World War 11.123 In addi-
tion, possibilities for conservation are enhanced when tied to
controllable factors rather than an immutable gender classifica-
tion.124 Insurance commissioners recognized this fact in the 1970s
115 See Testimony of Patrick Butler, supra note 96, at 10.
116 Id.
117 Id. This provision recognizes that the risk of accident does not increase in propor-
tion with miles driven, because much high mileage driving is accumulated on expressways,
which have lower accident rates than other roads. Id.
118 SeeJ. LEMAIRE, supra note 98, at 31-32.
119 Id.
120 Specifically, four safeguards were implemented in 1961 along with the mileage rating
system which ensure accurate estimation and reporting of mileage accrual. These safe-
guards are:
(1) The insured has to report his odometer reading on request.
(2) At the annual motor vehicle inspection (compulsory for vehicles more than
two years old), the reading of the odometer is registered.
(3) When a claim arises and the vehicle is left at a garage for repair, the odometer
reading is reported to the insurer.
(4) If a claim arises and it emerges that the annual distance class has been too
low, the amount of the indemnity will be reduced.
Id.
121 Butler reports, for instance, that odometer readings can be tied to state safety in-
spections or license renewals. Testimony of Patrick Butler, supra note 96, at 12.
122 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 26 app.
123 See COMPTROLLER GEN. REPORT, supra note 81, at 102.
124 "The incentive for any individual male to alter his behavior is weak as long as he has
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when they ordered insurers to reduce rates, adapting to reduced
consumer driving because of the energy crisis. 125
A final justification for the upheaval of current rating practices
in favor of mileage-based rating is efficiency. A 1979 Stanford Re-
search Institute report found that the ISO class plan, which in-
cluded sex as a rating variable, achieved thirty percent predictive
accuracy.' 26 While seventy percent of the variance in inherent risk
remained unexplained, criticism was limited because no other effi-
ciency rating was available for comparison. One study even stated
that thirty percent efficiency of the sex-based rating system was
"the best process now known."' 27 Recent actuarial data, however,
suggests that these figures can be improved. A model which used
mileage and seven other factors achieved a seventy-eight percent
efficiency rating over a test period of two and one-half years.' 28
In sum, mileage rating can replace sex in insurance classifica-
tion systems. Mileage rating attains the broad goals of social admis-
sibility and actuarial validity, while also satisfying the narrower
objectives mandated by political process compromises. In addition,
its use in foreign countries demonstrates its feasibility. While many
rating schemes do use mileage as a secondary variable for adult
drivers, its rating use has not been increased when sexual distinc-
tions are abandoned, and it is not used at all for drivers under
twenty-five. Without the substitution of this rating factor, the pro-
hibition of sex-differentiation prices results in an extreme price bias
against all low mileage drivers and the gross overcharging of wo-
men, as a class, relative to men. 29
IV. The Future of Unisex Automobile Insurance
While federal unisex legislation remains stalled in Congress,'8 0
women's groups are expected to shift their emphasis to the courts
no way of extracating himself from the group and obtaining more favorable treatment short
of altering his sex." Austin, supra note 91, at 558.
125 Testimony by the Pennsylvania National Organization for Women at Public Hearing
before the Pennsylvania House Insurance Committee, NOW transcript at 3, November 14,
1985 (available from the files of the Notre Dame Law Review).
126 STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE (May 1976) (supplement).
127 Aetna Life and Casualty Co., A Report on Automobile Insurance Affordability 78
(March 1978).
128 To form his rating scheme, Professor Lemaire picked the seven most statistically
valid rating factors out of 38 variables tested. These factors were age, the bonus-malus
system, vehicle power, geographic information, marital status, nationality, and mileage. See
J. LEMAIRE, supra note 98, at 100.
129 Testimony of Eleanor Smeal, President of NOW, before the New York Assembly
Task Force on Women's Issues, NOW transcript at 2 (October 8, 1985) (available from the
files of the Notre Dame Law Review).
130 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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and the state legislatures. 13 1 The first shot in this political battle
was fired recently when the Superior Court for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed a National Organization for Women (NOW) suit
challenging sex discrimination in medical and disability insur-
ance. 132 NOW has also filed suit against Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company in New York Supreme Court, alleging
discrimination against women in life and disability insurance poli-
cies. 133 These challenges of insurance practices signal a renewed
effort to implement unisex insurance in targeted state forums. Key
victories in the courts or in the state legislatures will not only ex-
tend the unisex mandate on a case-by-case basis, but will also rally
additional support needed to pass the desired federal legislation.
A. Action in State Courts
The state courts should anticipate continued litigation as a re-
sult of the decentralized attack strategy. Two variables are critical
to the legal analysis of the anticipated unisex litigation. First, the
standard of protection assigned to plaintiffs in discrimination ac-
tions is vital. Second, uncertainties involved in the state action doc-
trine are important considerations in the assessment process.
Whether insurance practices are challenged under state equal
protection clauses or state equal rights provisions, the standard of
protection adopted by the state courts will substantially shape the
outcome of the litigation. The Supreme Court has traditionally
viewed equal protection challenges in one of two ways. Where a
"fundamental right" is violated or a "suspect classification" is em-
ployed, the Court has applied a standard of strict scrutiny. 134
Under this test, a "compelling state interest" is required and the
means employed must be "necessary" to achieve the legislative
goals.' 35 Conversely, classifications which are not suspect and do
not involve fundamental rights are treated under the "rational ba-
sis" test. Here, the state's means need only be "appropriate" to
carry out a "legitimate government objective."' 136
131 Calmes, "Unisex" Insurance Fight Shifting Locale, CONG. Q., Jan. 26, 1985, at 148.
132 National Organization for Women v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 10023-84 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
28, 1985). See also State Div. of Human Rights v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 273 N.W.2d
111 (S.D. 1978) (business of insurance was not a covered public accommodation under the
Human Rights Act of 1972); Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or. 649, 549 P.2d 510
(1976) (pubic accommodations act did not cover the sale of insurance).
133 Lyons & Fisher, NOW Sues Met Life In N. Y. for Sex Bias, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: LIFE &
HEALTH INS. EDITION, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1.
134 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590-99 (2d ed.
1983).
135 Id. at 591-92.
136 Id. at 591.
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NOTES
In Craig v. Boren, 13 7 the Court created a middle level of scrutiny
for gender classifications. While not elevated to the level of a sus-
pect class, distinctions based upon sex are subject to a more search-
ing inquiry than the rational basis test. Specifically, under the
Court's middle standard of scrutiny, the governmental objectives
must be "important" and the means "substantially related" to car-
rying out these objectives.138 Under this standard of review, then,
the question is whether traditional sex distinctions in insurance pre-
miums are substantially related to the important governmental
objectives of equitable treatment of its citizens and proper regula-
tion of the insurance industry.' 39 One commentator has answered
this question negatively, claiming that the classification system em-
ployed in automobile risk classification "fails to have even a 'ra-
tional basis.' "140 The alternatives to current rating schemes
suggested earlier in this note also suggest that the traditional ap-
proach fails to pass the enunciated constitutional standard.
The Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation, however,
prescribes only the minimum level of rights which its citizens are af-
forded. State courts may expand the individual liberties of their
citizens beyond those conferred by the federal constitution.' 4 1 In
the controversy presented above, any state may choose to provide
greater protection for sex discrimination claimants under its equal
protection clause than is mandated under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thus, the courts of any state could require a strict scrutiny
analysis in cases challenging discriminatory insurance practices.
The seventeen states with constitutional equal rights provisions 42
137 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
138 Id. at 197.
139 See Comment, An Appraisal of Sex Discrimination in Setting Automobile Insurance Rates, 10
PAC. L.J. 201 (1976) (discussing the standard of strict scrutiny applied in California). The
author framed the issues as follows:
If elimination of the sex classification would severely restrict competition and mar-
ketability of insurance policies, this may be a sufficient compelling state interest to
continue allowing companies to utilize the sex classification. This seems to pre-
sume, however, that no other variables exist that could be used to predict the risk
of loss. . . . If it could be established that insurance companies would face seri-
ously diminishing returns by having to use other variables in the rate setting pro-
cess, then this may also be an interest to consider. It should be borne in mind,
however, that spreading the risk over a larger segment of the population would
not appear to result in lower profits but merely a reevaluation of available risk
classifications. Thus, unless a compelling state interest is shown in allowing this
type of discrimination, the California Supreme Court could strike the use of the
classification as unconstitutional under the California equal protection clause.
Id. at 216-17.
140 See Rating the Rating Schemes, supra note 81, at 693.
141 Cologne v. Westfarm Assocs., 37 Conn. Super. Ct. 90, 442 A.2d 471,477 (1982). See
also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
142 See ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, § 3 (1972); COLO. CONsT. art II, § 29 (1972); CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 20 (1974); HAWAii CONsT. art. I, § 21 (1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1971); LA.
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seem the most likely forums for such broad interpretations, as the
enactment of ERAs to state constitutions connotes a sensitivity to
the issue of sex discrimination not displayed in the other thirty-
three states. This is why women's groups have promised to focus
their reform efforts in these states.' 43 California adopted this ap-
proach in 1971 when its Supreme Court announced in Saier Inn v.
Kirby 144 that "classifications based upon sex would be treated as
suspect"' 45 and that a strict scrutiny test would apply. Two years
later, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted the same ap-
proach in Hanson v. Hutt.146 In a further extension of the doctrine
of expanded state protection, the Washington Supreme Court later
rejected the Hanson strict scrutiny approach in favor of a more pene-
trating standard of review. In Marchioro v. Chaney,147 the court held
that the passage of the state ERA required that no sexual classifica-
tions would be tolerated regardless of the governmental interest
involved. 48 Such an interpretation of state equal rights provisions
would clearly prohibit the current disparate treatment of men and
women in automobile insurance. Furthermore, such a reading is
correct since any other, more limited, interpretation does not do
justice to the sweeping mandatory language of the majority of state
equal rights provisions. 49 Thus, additional state protection from
gender-based distinctions, through the application of strict scrutiny
or a more penetrating standard of review, would enhance the suc-
cess rate of challenges to automobile insurance rating practices.' 5 0
CONST. art. I, § 3 (1974); MD. CONST. art. 46 (1972); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art I. (1976);
MONT. CONST. art II, § 4 (1973); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art 2 (1974); N.M. CONST. art II, § 18
(1973); PA. CONST. art. I § 28 (1971); TEX. CONST. art I, § 3a (1972); UTAH CONST. art IV,
§ 1 (1896); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (1971); WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972); Wyo.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, art VI, § 1 (1890).
143 See Calmes, supra note 131, at 148.
144 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
145 485 P.2d at 539.
146 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973).
147 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978).
148 582 P.2d at 491. The court stated that the state ERA requires that "the equal protec-
tion/suspect classification test [be] replaced by the single criterion: Is the classification by
sex discriminatory? or, in the language of the amendment, has equality been denied or
abridged on account of sex?" Id.
149 Id.
150 State court interpretations of the equal rights provisions have been far from predict-
able, however. One commentator noted four different approaches employed by state
courts in construing state equal rights provisions. First, some courts avoided interpretation
of the state ERA altogether. Second, some courts have applied a standard of rational basis
to questioned classifications under the state ERA, despite the clear state constitutional pol-
icy requiring equal rights. Third, some states adopt the strict scrutiny approach and treat
sex as a suspect classification, as the current California standard illustrates. Finally, two
states, Pennsylvania and Washington, have applied a standard of review more penetrating
than even strict scrutiny. Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State Consti-
tutions, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1086 (1977).
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The state action doctrine raises another question of state inter-
pretation. It is well settled that the fourteenth amendment applies
only to government action; it does not protect "private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful." 15' Like the flexibility in
choosing a standard of protection,152 a state may give its state con-
stitution a broad or limited scope through its application of the
state action doctrine. Generally, state clauses parallel to the four-
teenth amendment have required state action to enforce challenges
of equal protection. 153 Likewise, courts have applied state ERAs
only to discrimination conducted by the state itself or by entities
whose activities so involve the state as to establish the required gov-
ernmental nexus.154
Because automobile insurance is primarily a private industry,
the requirement of state action has often prevented courts from
considering challenges to discriminatory insurance practices. The
current Supreme Court has reinforced this obstacle. By encourag-
ing state resolution of individual rights issues, the Court has nar-
rowed the state action requirement. 55 The traditional view of
federalism currently adopted by the Court holds that a state is not
responsible for the discriminatory acts of private parties unless the
state, through regulation, compelled the act.' 56 In Blum v. Yaret-
sky,' 57 for example, the Supreme Court espoused a three-part test
to determine whether state regulation of private industry satisfied
the state action requirement. In each prong of the Blum test, the
Court emphasized that significant state involvement is needed to
satisfy the required governmental nexus.' 58
151 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
152 See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 915 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (Mich. Const. equal protection clause has state action requirement); Schreiner v. Mc-
Kenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs. 408 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(Fla. Const. equal protection clause has state action requirement), aj'd, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla.
1983); Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998, 1001-04 (1977) (Conn. Const.
requires state action); Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. New York
State Congress for Parents and Teachers, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 548, 408 N.Y.S.2d 261, 265
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (N.Y. Const. equal protection clause requires state action).
154 See U.S. Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594,
463 N.E.2d 1151 (1984); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922
(Tex. Ct. App. 1979); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d
1027 (1979), rev'don othergrounds, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981). See also Md. Op.
Att'y Gen., slip. op. (March 7, 1983) (Md. ERA carries state action requirement). But see
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542
(1984); notes 168-69 infra and accompanying text.
155 See Comment, supra note 139, at 211.
156 Id.
157 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
158 The Blum test provides that:
First .... [t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
19861 NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The method by which state insurance commissions participate
in the automobile rate setting process varies from state to state. 5 9
In the majority of states, insurers submit rate proposals to the in-
surance department in advance of use.1 60 The department reviews
the proposals with the authority to force changes if the rates meet
the state's definition of "unfair" discrimination.16 1 Such a system
has not established the required state nexus in the Supreme Court's
application of the Blum standard. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,162 for example, the Court held that a public utility proposal to
discontinue service on reasonable notice for nonpayment of bills
did not satisfy the state action requirement. The Court deemed
critical the fact that the state involvement constituted mere ap-
proval of termination procedures initiated by the private utility
Amendment .... The complaining party must also show that "there is a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself".... The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional stan-
dards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the spe-
cific conduct which the plaintiff complains....
Second, although the factual setting of each case will be significant, our prece-
dents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision
only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encour-
agement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the state .... Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private
party is not sufficient to justify holding the state responsible for those initiatives
under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment....
Third, the required nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised
powers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."
Id. at 1004-05.
159 See J. LEMAIRE, supra note 98, at 41-42. Professor Lemaire summarized the varying
levels of state involvement as follows:
1. State-made rates laws. Rates are set by the state with strict adherence by all
insurers. Insurers are permitted to pay dividends to policy holders. Only a few
states have enacted this type of law.
2. Mandatory bureau membership laws. Rates are made by rating bureaus to
which all companies must belong. Companies may deviate from bureau rates only
with specific approval of the state insurance department .... Only a few states
have enacted this type of law.
3. Prior approval laws. Rates must be approved by the state insurance depart-
ment before they can be used. Bureau membership generally is permitted but not
required. Insurers may also file their own rates independently. The majority of
states have enacted this type of law.
4. Modified prior approval laws (use and file). Prior approval of rates is not re-
quired. However, rates must be filed with the state insurance department before
they can be used. The state insurance department retains the right to subse-
quently disapprove rates.
5. File and use. Rates may be used and then filed with the state insurance depart-
ment, which retains the right to subsequently disapprove rates.
6. No file. A few states do not require any rate filings.
Id.
160 Id.
161 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
162 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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rather than action officially instigated by the state regulatory au-
thority. 163 The Pennsylvania Superior Court employed similar rea-
soning in Murphy v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. 164 In Murphy,
the court rejected a challenge to the state's automobile insurance
rate setting procedures. Thus, the majority of state ratemaking
procedures fail the second part of the Blum state action standard
because the state's prior approval scheme does not involve "coer-
cive power" or "significant encouragement" by the state. 165 In
states that either require membership in rating bureaus or deter-
mine insurance rates themselves, 66 however, the level of state in-
volvement is increased to the point where the state action
requirement may be satisfied.
In Pennsylvania, claims brought under the state ERA no longer
require averment to state action. Two recent decisions have re-
versed a line of cases expousing the traditional requirement of gov-
ernmental activity in claims brought under the state ERA. As stated
in Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner167 and
affirmed in Welsch v. Aetna Insurance Co., 168
[t]he rationale underlying the "state action" doctine is irrelevant
to the interpretation of the scope of the Pennsylvania Equal
Rights Amendment, a state constitutional amendment adopted
by the Commonwealth as part of its own organic law. The lan-
163 Id. at 357. In holding the requisite state action was not met, the Court noted that:
The nature of governmental regulations of private utilities is such that a utility may
frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for prac-
tices a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any ap-
proval from a regulatory body. Approval by a state utility commission of such a
request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its weight on
the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice
initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into "state action." At
most, the Commission's failure to overturn this practice amounted to no more
than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a
practice if it so desired. Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law
where the initiative comes from it and not from the state, does not make its action
in doing so "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
164 282 Pa. Super. 244, 442 A.2d 1097 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981). The
requirement in Murphy that state action must be alleged under the Pennsylvania ERA was
overturned in Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 169, 494 A.2d 409 (1985). See notes
167-69 infra and accompanying text.
165 See note 158 supra. See also Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1979) (no state action found under prior approval insurance scheme); Broaderick v.
Associated Hosp. Servs., 536 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1976) (state approval of health insurance con-
tracts and rates not state action); Jackson v. Associated Hosp. Servs., 414 F. Supp. 315 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (claim against state and private insurers alleging discrimination in maternity ben-
efits rejected because no state action), aff'd, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832
(1977).
166 See note 159 supra.
167 505 Pa. 571,482 A.2d 542 (1984).
168 343 Pa. Super. 169, 494 A.2d 409 (1985).
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guage of that enactment, not a text used to measure the extent
of federal constitutional protections, is controlling.1 69
These rulings may have an enormous impact on the unisex bat-
tles conducted in state forums. If other states follow suit in af-
firming the independent significance of their ERA's as statements
of intended policy, the traditional hurdle of showing state action to
the level of "coercive power" or "significant encouragement" is re-
moved. Coupled with the possibility for courts to invalidate auto-
mobile rating schemes under a "middle-level scrutiny," or even a
more protective standard of review,' 70 the potential for judicial re-
form at the state level is real. If accomplished even in limited target
areas, such developments would be major victories for those lobby-
ing for insurance reform, as strong regional triumphs would only
add support for those continuing the struggle in Congress.
B. Action in the State Legislatures
Many state legislatures have proposed unisex automobile legis-
lation similar to the statutes enacted in Hawaii, North Carolina,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Montana.1 71 While further enact-
ments of such legislation would affirm the policy goals behind the
unisex objective, any statute which addresses only the prohibition
of rating variables confronts merely one-half of the problem. The
implementations of unisex automobile insurance in the states which
have adopted these statutes demonstrates that the insurance re-
sponse has consisted of an affirmance of flat-based pricing.172 Such
a result can only be expected; insurers are merely following the let-
ter of the law in enacting rating schemes which prohibit the use of
sex as a rating variable. The title usually given to such legislation,
unisex insurance, suggest that the flat-based cost schemes imple-
mented for men and women under thirty are acceptable-even
desired.
For this reason, the distinction between "unisex insurance
alone" and "classification without regard to sex" is proposed.17 3 If
states are to adopt a policy forbidding gender-based distinctions,
they must substitute other rating variables for the sexual classifica-
tions. States could implement mileage rating as a mandatory rating
variable as a part of a newly enacted classification system or as an
amendment to a state's rate regulation statute. NOW made such a
proposal in public hearings before the Pennsylvania House Insur-
169 Welsh, 494 A.2d at 412.
170 See notes 137-50 supra and accompanying text.
171 See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
172 See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
173 See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
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ance Committee in 1985.174 Key aspects of this provision mandat-
ing the use of mileage rating are (1) a flexibility to allow for the
administrative expenses in automobile insurance rating; and (2) rat-
ing calculation proportionally dependent upon the number of miles
driven. 175 Under such a scheme, insurers would still have consider-
able freedom in determining the market price of per-mile driving
by using any justifiable rating variable.
Such a legislative proposal corrects the deficiencies of current
unisex statutes which fail to require cost-based calculations. The
resulting transition to cost-based insurance rating can be actuarially
efficient and socially equitable to all parties involved in the automo-
bile rating controversy.
V. Conclusion
Changes in social attitudes and pressures from interest groups
have forced a reexamination of the methods used to rate insurable
risk. The Supreme Court's spark in the Manhart and Norris deci-
sions ignited many unisex insurance proposals, which have kindled
into a flame of legislative reform that challenges the very nature of
current insurance practices. Social policy concerns have demanded
that the focus of insurance rating shift from group classifications to
individual attributes. The elimination of sex-based distinctions in
automobile insurance rating is an attempt to legislate this goal.
Fueled by several state legislative enactments and judicial dec-
larations, the quest for social equity has come at the expense of
statistical validity in automobile insurance rating. Specifically, the
elimination of sex as a rating variable without the corresponding
substitution of other rating characteristics has resulted in a shift
from cost-based to flat-based automobile insurance pricing in juris-
dictions adopting unisex rating schemes. While the initial objective
of eliminating unfair sexual distinctions is admirable, these changes
must be accompanied by the implementation of mileage rating to
achieve accuracy and fairness in automobile insurance practices.
Without future emphasis on the goal of accuracy in automobile rat-
174 See Testimony by the Pennsylvania National Organization for Women at Public Hear-
ing before the Pennsylvania House Insurance Committee, NOW transcript at 3, Nov. 14,
1985 (available from the files of the Notre Dame Law Review). The NOW proposal stated
that:
For the purposes of the [Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory] act in its applica-
tion to all insurance of a motor vehicle against losses resulting only from its opera-
tion, a standard for measure that shall be used to compare individual risks in the
same class in what is termed "expected losses," "loss exposure," and "variations
in hazards" is either the amount of time the motor vehicle is driven or the distance
it travels, starting from zero and continuously increasing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
175 See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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ing techniques, the fires of reform, fueled only by the social policy
of equality, will burn out of control.
Stephen R. Ryan
